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 In this thesis it is argued that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of 
the imagination, and that by understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather 
than schematic, the resources are provided to show that his critical philosophy has more 
radical possibilities than those of his post-Kantian critics.  To display this, it is first 
pointed out that the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn is not 
fully developed in his first Critique.  Next, it is argued that Kant's doctrine of the 
imagination is not fully realized until the third Critique in which Kant radicalizes his 
notion of constructivism by introducing a distinction between determinative and 
reflective judgments.  Finally, it is suggested that while Hegel believes that Kant’s 
idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when 
Kant’s mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case 
because Kant believes that our particular experiences of the world unfold artistically and 
creatively according to the work of the imagination.  It is suggested, therefore, that in 
 iv 
many ways Kant anticipates the developments of thinkers such as Hegel and other post-





To Nanny and Papaw 




 I would like to thank Michael Peterson, Jerry Walls, and Brandon Look who took 
the time to encourage me in my pursuit of a master’s degree in philosophy.  Also, I am 
grateful to Scott Austin and Kristi Sweet for helping me to conceive of this project.  My 
committee members, Daniel Conway and Marian Eide, have also taken much interest in 
this thesis, giving me both guidance and confidence.  I am especially indebted to my 
thesis advisor and mentor, Ted George, who has made himself available night and day 
and put up with draft after draft of this thesis—helping me to become a philosopher. 
 Without the support of my parents, Shannon, Matt, Harold, Nancy, and Jesse this 
degree would not have even been possible.  And so, even though I have learned that 
“Life in San Francisco is still just life,” I thank them for making the trip there possible in 
the first place.   
 My wife, Sarah, who has endured much with “quiet confidence” for the sake of 
my education, cannot even begin to be thanked.  She has opened my imagination to 
beauty and love—the kind that does not die.     
 What would an education be without books?  My Nanny and Papaw have always 
insisted on buying my books for each school year.  Without these books my thesis would 
not have been possible.  My Nanny and Papaw, therefore, have been instrumental in the 
generation of my thesis.  It is for this reason, and for so many others, that I dedicate this 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
              Page 
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................  iii 
DEDICATION ..........................................................................................................  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................  vii 
CHAPTER 
 I INTRODUCTION: THE CRITICAL IMPETUS ...............................  1 
 II THE SCHEMATIC IMAGINATION IN KANT’S CRITIQUE OF  
  PURE REASON....................................................................................  7 
 
  The Copernican Turn and Kant’s Constructivism................................  9 
  The Crucial Imagination.......................................................................  13 
  Heidegger’s Critique ............................................................................  26 
  The Imagination Beyond the First Critique .........................................  32 
 
 III THE SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION IN KANT’S CRITIQUE OF 
  THE POWER OF JUDGMENT ...........................................................  34 
 
  Purposivity and Reflection in the Third Critique.................................  35 
  Reflective Judgment and the Free Play of the Imagination..................  45 
  The Symbolic Imagination and Kant’s Constructivism .......................  52 
  Returning to the Critics ........................................................................  59 
 
 IV THE DYNAMIC IMAGINATION: THE POSSIBILITIES OF  
  KANT’S CONSTRUCTIVISM ...........................................................  60 
 
          V       CONCLUSION: REALIZING THE RADICAL IMAGINATION .....  71 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................................  75 
VITA .........................................................................................................................  77 
 1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE CRITICAL IMPETUS  
 
The judgement of history will be that a greater outer and inner battle for the 
highest possessions of the human spirit was never fought; at no time has the 
endeavour of the scientific spirit led to deeper experiences and experiences more 
rich in results than since Kant. 
—F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy 
 
 
 With Kant something new begins in philosophy.  As the opening 
quotation suggests, Schelling, one of Kant’s successors and critics, believed this was so.  
Despite the fact that Kant’s life was relatively mundane and uneventful, his philosophy 
was explosive, a watershed in the history of ideas.  The opening quotation also implies 
that Kant’s nearest historical heirs understood this about his philosophy.  Perhaps it is 
through this philosophical novelty that we discover anew the ways in which Kant’s 
philosophy not only opens up innovative questions in the history of ideas, but also, in 
many ways, still lies beyond our philosophical horizon.  Perhaps we ought not infer—as 
does the German poet Heinrich Heine—that Kant’s habitual journeys up and down the 
“Philosopher’s Walk” represent a sharp contrast with his “world-annihilating thoughts,” 
but rather that his walks reveal an insistence that his philosophy derives its quality and 
depth from patient, plodding regularity—that the regular patterns of life might conceal a 
radical spontaneous depth only revealed through the life of the imagination.1 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style and format of the Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1 Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany, trans. John Snodgrass 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 108-109. 
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But what is this novelty?  What is this project that still lies beyond our 
philosophical horizon?  Furthermore, what basis is there for supposing that this horizon 
has not yet been glimpsed?  Have not thinkers such as Hegel and Heidegger and others 
shown the limitations of Kant’s philosophy?  Has not Hegel revealed that Kant’s 
idealism is tethered to a static rendering of the categories?  Has not Heidegger concluded 
that whereas Kant’s initial project seemed promising, he nevertheless “shrank back” 
from its truly radical consequences?  Has not the history of philosophy since 1781 
unfolded as a series of developments and refutations of Kant’s guiding insight?2  Perhaps 
this is so.  Kant’s philosophy, however, is resilient.  Many of Kant’s successors claimed 
to have taken his Copernican turn, but to have done so in a more radical way than Kant 
himself.  However, insofar as these thinkers have failed to understand the full import of 
the imagination in Kant’s philosophy they have understood Kant’s project only in a 
limited sense.  In other words, they have not yet seen the truly radical implications of 
Kant’s Copernican turn.  This radicality, when given expression, frees Kant to go 
beyond Hegel.  It reveals a philosophy that does not “shrink back” from its potential, but 
rather embraces and even goes beyond Heidegger’s interpretation by centering Kant’s 
key insight in the imagination.  This potential is quietly, patiently—but, nonetheless, 
                                                 
2 Tom Rockmore, In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century 
(Malden, MA.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 19.  Robert B. Pippin, The Persistence of 
Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
32.  Also see Frederick Beiser, “The Enlightenment and Idealism,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to German Idealism, Karl Ameriks, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 28-29.  
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radically—woven into the tapestry of Kant’s main philosophical insight—the 
Copernican turn. 
 The purpose of this thesis therefore will be to address this radicality by 
suggesting that although Kant's doctrine of the imagination is crucial to understanding 
his Copernican turn, its centrality to his critical philosophy and its success has largely 
been underappreciated.  Thus, I will argue that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his 
doctrine of the imagination and that understanding the role of imagination as symbolic 
rather than schematic provides the resources which show that his critical philosophy has 
more radical possibilities than the versions developed by his post-Kantian critics.  To 
display this I will first point out the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's 
Copernican turn and argue that this doctrine is not fully developed in his first Critique.  
Next I will argue that Kant fully develops the imagination in the third Critique by 
introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments.  Finally, I will 
argue that while Hegel believes that Kant’s idealism is not dynamic enough to support a 
full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant’s mature doctrine of the imagination is 
taken into account, this is no longer the case.  I will suggest, therefore, that in many 
ways Kant anticipates such developments and may even continue to lie beyond them. 
 In Chapter II of my thesis I will suggest that Kant's doctrine of the imagination, 
although central, is not yet fully developed and points beyond the limits of the first 
Critique.  To this end I will first point out that Kant’s key insight is that the human mind 
actually constructs its knowledge of the world—it serves as the source from which 
knowledge of the world flows.  Accordingly, I will point out that in the first Critique one 
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of Kant's central concerns is to show that the two faculties of the human mind—the 
intuition and the understanding—coalesce to form certain knowledge.  These two 
faculties, Kant believes, are however disparate and must be mediated by a “third thing” 
if they are to be synthesized at all.  For this purpose, Kant uses the notion of the 
imagination as that third thing which schematically mediates between the intuition and 
the understanding.  Indeed, the imagination makes the synthesis of these two faculties 
possible.  Third, I will suggest that attempts to interpret the imagination as a “root” 
faculty ultimately fail to appreciate the mysteriousness in which Kant shrouds this 
doctrine in the first Critique.  Here, I will criticize Heidegger's reading of the first 
Critique and suggest that while his reading is not wrong-headed on the whole, Kant’s 
view of the imagination in this work is more suggestive than Heidegger allows.  I will 
conclude by suggesting that while Kant's doctrine of the imagination is indeed central to 
his project and seems pregnant with possibility, it nevertheless remains schematic and 
mysterious, pointing beyond the confines of the first Critique.   
 In Chapter III I will argue that Kant’s doctrine of the imagination in the third 
Critique is truly radical because it is the means by which nature is revealed as purposive.  
First, I will point out that Kant’s main aim in the third Critique is to investigate the 
limits and possibilities of purposive thinking.  To this end I will show that he expands 
the faculty of judgment as reflective in addition to the determinate judgments of the first 
Critique.  Second, since Kant believes that it is in judgments of beauty that purposive 
thinking is revealed, I will argue that this leads to a new sense of the imagination for the 
critical philosophy.  I will point out that these judgments arise from a free play between 
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the imagination and the understanding, a relationship that Kant did not articulate in the 
first Critique.  Finally, I will argue that Kant’s notion of the imagination in the third 
Critique represents the symbolic use of reflective judgments which suggests that Kant’s 
doctrine of the imagination reveals a radical constructivism whereby aesthetic ideas 
provide the means by which our concepts and experience of nature are expanded and 
enriched. 
 In Chapter IV I will argue that, whereas Hegel criticized Kant for being too 
conservatively tethered to the categories, given the formulation of the imagination in the 
third Critique, Kant’s development of the Copernican turn is indeed radical enough and 
that his critical philosophy anticipates and, in many ways, goes beyond Hegel’s system.  
First, I will focus on Hegel who is often taken to advance Kant’s key insight well beyond 
Kant’s own conception by claiming that while the Copernican turn must be taken, Kant’s 
constructivism does not go far enough since it remains tethered to an undynamic view of 
the categories.3 I will argue, however, that given the insight of the indeterminate and 
spontaneous nature of the imagination along with its unifying responsibility, Kant’s view 
of the imagination indicates a radically dynamic development of the Copernican turn.  
Second, I will suggest that viewing Kant’s idealism through the lens of the third 
Critique, with particular attention to the imagination, allows one to see the radical nature 
of Kant’s project as a whole.  Finally, I will conclude by making the gesture that not 
only does this apply to Hegel’s criticism of Kant, but to other post-Kantian’s as well.  In 
other words, the upshot of my thesis will be that in so far as Kant’s successors 
                                                 
3 Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 
161. 
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incorporate his key insight, but fail to appreciate the creative work of the imagination in 
his thought, Kant’s constructivism anticipates and still lies beyond them. 
 In Chapter V I will conclude by summarizing the work I have done and indicate 
some ways in which the work of this thesis is not finished.  Indeed, I will suggest that, 
by moving from the schematic to the symbolic imagination in Kant, much research 
opens up with respect the philosophers who came after Kant. 
 With this structure in mind, let us turn to the beginning, which has already begun.  
If we are to inquire into the potential of Kant’s view of the imagination as it is revealed 
in his Copernican turn, we must turn to the genesis of his critical project—the Critique 




























THE SCHEMATIC IMAGINATION IN KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
 
 
Kant proves to us that we know nothing about things as they are in and by 
themselves, but that we have a knowledge of them only in so far as they are 
reflected in our minds. 
—Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany 
 
 
Kant’s successors recognized the prescience of his Copernican turn.  Indeed, 
Schelling remarks that “Kant had a beneficial effect just by the fact that he really set to 
work once more in a methodical and serious manner, and thereby put an end to that 
philosophical anarchy which preceded him . . .”4 Heidegger writes that his interpretation 
of Kant’s first Critique lays the ground for “placing the problem of metaphysics before 
us as a fundamental ontology.”5  That these thinkers believed that Kant’s philosophy 
enacted a crucial turn in the history of philosophy does not mean however that they 
thought his project lived up to its potential.  On the contrary, Heidegger had deep 
reservations about the nature of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination and how it relates to 
his project as a whole.  It is my claim that when Kant’s doctrine of the imagination is 
taken as a crucial aspect of his Copernican turn, the radical nature of Kant’s philosophy 
opens itself to possibilities that go beyond those of his critics.  Hence, in this chapter I 
                                                 
4 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, 
Texts in German Philosophy, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 106. 
 
5 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Fifth Edition, trans. 
Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 1. 
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will first inquire into the nature of Kant’s project and show that his Copernican turn is a 
truly radical insight in the history of philosophy.  Second I will argue that Kant’s 
doctrine of the imagination is essential to the success of his philosophical project 
because it is ultimately the imagination which unites the understanding and the intuition 
through judgment.  This second point is consistent with many thinkers who take Kant’s 
view of the imagination to be central to his entire project.6  The centrality of the 
imagination in Kant’s philosophy, however, has fallen out of favor with several 
commentators who interpret Kant from a broadly analytic epistemological point of 
view.7  Thus, while several seminal works in Kant scholarship are important for 
interpreting Kant on the whole, I will limit my discussion to those who take the 
imagination to be central.   Third, I will consider Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s view of 
the imagination which suggests that Kant recoiled from the radical implications of the 
imagination understood as a root faculty in the A-deduction.  In response, I wish to show 
that while Heidegger’s claims are indeed warranted by some of the language of the first 
Critique, Kant, even in the B-deduction, retains the centrality of the imagination as is 
evidenced in the section on the Schematism.  In conclusion, I will propose that since the 
Schematism does not fully reveal the imagination we must look elsewhere to discover 
                                                 
6 For example, Heidegger, Kant and Metaphysics, 89-142. Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s 
Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). Bernard 
Freydberg, Imagination and Depth in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1994). 
 
7 For example, Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation 
and Defense (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 219-222.  See also Freydberg, 
Imagination and Depth, 85, n. 2.  
 9 
the truly radical implications of Kant’s view of the imagination.  We must look to the 
third Critique.  
The Copernican Turn and Kant’s Constructivism 
The Enlightenment faced a debilitating crisis during the latter half of the 18th 
Century.  Fred Beiser suggests that this crisis had two main fronts.  On the one hand the 
scepter of skepticism had risen which challenged the Enlightenment hope that true 
knowledge of the world could be achieved.  On the other hand, materialism threatened 
the possibility of complete freedom of the individual, without which the Enlightenment 
ideal of autonomy would be impossible.8  Robert Pippin also suggests that “If modern 
philosophy in some way culminated in Humean skepticism and Berkleyean idealism . . . 
then not only was metaphysics in trouble, but, many began to fear, so were any claims to 
our allegiance made by any normative principle.”9  Kant found himself, therefore, in the 
midst of a dilemma: either embrace empiricism and skepticism or embrace materialism 
and determinism. As he told the story in the Preface to the First Edition of the first 
Critique, the battleground of metaphysics had been overrun with dogmatists 
(rationalists) and skeptics (empiricists) who had, in spite of all their efforts, run the ship 
of metaphysics aground, lapsing back into the “ancient time-worn dogmatism . . . from  
                                                 
8 Frederick Beiser, “The Enlightenment and Idealism.” in The Cambridge 
Companion to German Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 18. 
 
9 Pippin, Persistence of Subjectivity, 28. 
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which it was to have been rescued.”10  He believed that in spite of all the skepticism and 
dogmatism in which philosophy found itself ensnared, there was a way to break free 
from this dogmatism and move towards the ideals of the Enlightenment. This could only 
be done in a limited way though, for Kant also stated in his first preface that “Human 
reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by 
questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, 
but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer” (Avii). In other 
words, human reason inevitably surpasses its own limits.  Kant believed that within these 
limits, however, the keys to the gates of the Enlightenment could be found.  Hence, as is 
often pointed out, he called for a new inquiry into self-knowledge, a new tribunal the 
object of which would be reason itself.11  Kant believed that this critique would 
determine the very possibility and limits of metaphysics.   
In the Preface to the Second Edition, Kant elaborated further on the significance 
of his project.  The task of metaphysics he claimed was to find a priori knowledge, but 
this had, thus far, proved an elusive goal.  Those in the sciences, however, had learned 
that “reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own” and 
therefore that reason serves as a “judge” rather than a “pupil” (Bxiii).  Kant believed that 
metaphysics ought to emulate the sciences in this way since it had proved such a benefit 
                                                 
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), Ax.  Henceforth citations of Kant’s first Critique will be 
from the Kemp Smith edition and provided in-text.  
 
11 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 3.  Pippin also notes that, “Kant’s 
revolution amounted to his insistence that he proper object of reason’s attention was not 
the noetic or substantial structure of reality, but itself.”  See Pippin, 32. 
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for them.  Thus, he proposed to “imitate their procedure” in order to discover whether a 
priori knowledge of objects is indeed possible.  He strikingly claimed that, “We must 
therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, 
if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge” (Bxvi).  This is opposed to 
the view that our knowledge must conform to objects.  What this suggests is that, to use 
Deleuze’s phrase, it is we who are giving the orders.12  Kant then linked his project with 
that of Copernicus who suggested that rather than the stars revolving around the 
spectator, the spectator revolved around the stars.  The point Kant is making is that a 
shift must occur if metaphysics is to be vindicated.  The spectator, the human mind, now 
revolves around the fixed phenomena, illuminating them when they come “within the 
intellectual orb.”13  This is what has come to be known as Kant’s “Copernican Turn.”  
Tom Rockmore refers to this as Kant’s “constructivism” by which Rockmore means “the 
view that a necessary condition of knowledge is that the knower construct, make, or 
produce its cognitive object as a necessary condition for knowledge.”14  Rockmore also 
points out that there is little historical connection between Kant and Copernicus, but that 
the shift is crucial to understanding the novelty of Kant’s constructivism.15  The novelty 
of his position was not that he invented constructivism as such, but rather that he turned 
                                                 
12 Deleuze,  14. 
 
 13 This phrase is Heine’s.  See his Religion and Philosophy, 114. 
 
14 Rockmore, Kant and Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 9. 
 
15 Ibid., 56-57. 
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the prevailing epistemological view on its head.16  In Schelling’s view the significant 
effect of Kant was that he “directed philosophy towards the subjective” and thus opened 
the way to idealism.17  Kant became therefore, by means of his Copernican turn in 
philosophy, the father of German Idealism—opening up new possibilities for an idealist 
version of constructivism. 
The question still remains, however: What exactly is Kant’s constructivism and 
why should it be considered radical?  Simply stating that it is the view that the objects of 
the world must conform to our knowledge rather than the other way around is not to say 
very much, for, as noted above, this doctrine is not unique to Kant.  Furthermore, with 
respect to post-Kantian German idealism, idealist constructivism takes on many guises.  
While it can be said, with Schelling, that Kant “directed philosophy towards the 
subjective,” it can also be said that subsequent philosophers—including Schelling, 
Hegel, and Heidegger—developed this subjectivism in ways that were different than (if 
not opposed to) Kant’s critical philosophy.18  So, what is it that made Kant’s view 
distinctive?  More pointedly (for the purposes of this chapter at least), how is it that 
Kant’s insight into the nature of the imagination proves his constructivism to be more 
prescient than those of his successors?  To develop an answer to this question we must 
                                                 
16 Rockmore points out that Hobbes and Vico were constructivists of sorts.  See 
Ibid., 58. 
 
17 Schelling, Modern Philosophy, 106 (emphasis original). 
 
18 Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 11-14.  Also, Ottfried Höffe, 
Immanuel Kant, trans. Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 55.  Also, Rockmore, Kant and Idealism, 49.   
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peer deeper into the details of Kant’s Copernican turn in order to discover its 
possibilities.  We must begin where his critical philosophy began—in the first Critique.           
The Crucial Imagination 
Kant divides his first Critique into two main sections.  In the first, which he titles 
the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, Kant explores the functions and limitations 
of the faculties of the mind.  In the introduction he has already set up his guiding 
question: “How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?” (B19).  As noted above, his 
unique hypothesis is that objects in the world rather than setting the terms for knowledge 
actually conform to knowledge.  Kant also believes that while all of our knowledge 
begins with experience, it is not the case that all of our knowledge arises out of 
experience (B1).  Kant therefore believes that there are two main faculties which serve 
as the basis for knowledge.  It is these two faculties that he explores in the 
Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements. 
This division of the faculties should not be passed over lightly, for it provides the 
impetus for many post-Kantian critiques.  Pippin points out that Hegel saw these 
“dualisms” as a deep rending of the structure of reality itself.  Thus, for Hegel, the very 
basic Kantian notion that the faculties of our mind are divided reveals a deeply 
incoherent form of life.19  One task of this section, therefore, will be to draw out the 
means by which Kant thought these divisions could be transcended.  I wish to show that 
it is the imagination that provides such a bridge.    
                                                 
19 See Pippin, 36, particularly n. 23. 
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The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements is itself divided into two parts 
according to the two faculties.  First, the Transcendental Aesthetic explores the faculty 
of the sensibility.  Intuition, the means by which our knowledge immediately relates to 
objects, takes place only upon the event of a given.  The mind must be affected in some 
way in order for Kant’s belief that all knowledge does in fact begin with experience to 
hold true.  This capacity or faculty Kant names the sensibility.  This capacity enables the 
mind to receive representations from objects through sensation which must be given 
because “in no other way can an object be given to us” (A19/B33).  That which is given, 
however, must adhere to a certain form and be ordered in a certain way so that sensation 
can occur.  This capacity for ordering is the pure intuition which can be considered a 
priori and is the “form of sensibility” (A20/B34).  Kant, since he is concerned with 
knowledge a priori, spends the rest of the Transcendental Aesthetic exploring this 
capacity. 
Kant begins by articulating how time and space are to be understood as a priori 
forms of the sensibility.  Time, Kant believes, is not absolute (i.e., does not exist in 
objects), but rather is empirically real.  That is, since time—what Höffe calls “intuitive 
time”—must be presupposed in each and every appearance, it follows, Kant believes, 
that it is not something that can inhere in objects themselves.  Time, therefore, is a 
condition for all inner intuition (A34/B50).  Similarly, space is an a priori condition of 
intuition because there is no other way that objects can be presented to us—space always 
accompanies our intuitions (A24/B39).  In short, in one of his most philosophically 
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original moments, Kant grasps that time and space are two sources of knowledge from 
which the mind obtains a priori synthetic knowledge (A38/B55).20 
It follows from this, Kant believes, that our intuition is “nothing but the 
representation of appearance” (A42/B59).  If the intuitions of that which is given rely on 
conditions of the human mind (as, of course, is consistent with Kant’s Copernican turn), 
then if these conditions vanished, so would the objects in space and time.  The faculty of 
sensibility, therefore, is a mode of knowing without the conditions of which sensation 
itself would be impossible.  Furthermore, as a corollary, Kant points out that this 
suggests that it is never possible to have knowledge of objects “in themselves” apart 
from our experience of them.  The representations which are formed by the sensibility 
are necessarily subjective, but this does not mean that they are mere illusions since they 
are also empirical.  Kant carefully articulates the conditions for the sensibility by 
pointing out that in order for sensation to be possible, an object must be given.  That is, 
while objects which have been given depend on the conditions of a priori sensibility, 
they are nonetheless “actually given” (B69).21  Hence, although this provides an entry 
point for post-Kantian criticisms, Kant believes that all of our knowledge must begin 
with an object given in experience and therefore our intuitions are not subjectively ideal, 
but rather empirically real.22   
                                                 
20 See Höffe, 53. 
 
21 This claim is added in the second edition of the first Critique perhaps to more 
clearly distinguish his position from that of Berkeley’s.  See Beiser, German Idealism, 
88-92. 
 
22 Höffe, 55.  See also, Deleuze, 14 and Rockmore, Kant and Idealism, 23. 
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While it is true that all knowledge begins with experience, more is needed to 
arrive at knowledge.  One aspect of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible has 
been discovered, but it still remains to be seen how concepts can be extended a priori to 
form synthetic judgments.  Kant’s concern in the Transcendental Aesthetic though is 
subsumed under his broader concern of the Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements—
he is concerned to show the conditions under which an object is given.  This task, Kant 
thinks, has been achieved in so far as the forms of the sensibility have been discovered to 
be a priori.  That is, by realizing that time and space are necessary preconditions for 
objects to be given to the sensibility, Kant believes his task in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic is complete and he must now move on to discover the conditions for the 
understanding. 
This second task Kant titles the Transcendental Logic.  Having already laid down 
the rules of the sensibility Kant is concerned here with the rules of the understanding.  
The understanding, Kant writes, is the “mind’s power of producing representations for 
itself, the spontaneity of knowledge” which “enables us to think the object of sensible 
intuition” (A51/B75).  Indeed, this is the power of knowing an object which has been 
given in intuition.  Again, Kant divides this section into two parts: The Transcendental 
Analytic, which is concerned with the a priori conditions of concepts and the 
Transcendental Dialectic, which is concerned with the illusions of transcendental 
judgments (A297/B354).  It is in the Transcendental Analytic that Kant presents the way 
in which these two disparate faculties (sensibility and understanding) can be mediated to 
form a priori synthetic judgments.   
 17 
The first task Kant sets out in this section, the Analytic of Concepts, is to 
discover the a priori conditions for the concepts of the understanding by investigating 
the understanding alone (A66/B90).  Given that sensations do not provide rules by which 
objects can be known, concepts, Kant points out, are functions which involve subsuming 
various representations under one common representation, thus providing structure for 
empirical reality.23  This function Kant calls judgment.  Hence, the understanding is a 
faculty of judgment which unites the manifold of the a priori sensibility.  That is, in 
order for intuitions to avoid blindness they need judgments to guide them to the proper 
concept (cf. A51/B75).  This act of judgment which connects the manifold of sensibility 
and the spontaneity of the understanding Kant refers to as a synthesis.  This synthesis is 
a gathering together of the elements of knowledge (the sensibility and the understanding) 
and uniting them to “form a certain content” (A78/B103).  The nature of this synthesis is 
therefore a key to understanding how these two disparate faculties of the mind unite to 
form this “certain content.”  Ernst Cassirer writes, “Judgment is the natural, factually 
demanded correlate of the object, since it expresses in the most general sense the 
consummation of and demand for that combination to which the concept of the object 
has been reduced for us.”24  Kant’s view of the synthesis between the intuition and the 
categories of the understanding, therefore, underscores his Copernican turn: objects in 
experience cannot be known without rules that organize them and it is these rules that 
                                                 
23 Höffe, 66. 
 
24 Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought, trans. James Haden (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981), 172. 
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make truth possible.25  That a synthesis between the two faculties is key, however, leads 
to a crucial point in the first Critique—a crucial point that, for Kant, will remain 
somewhat mysterious throughout, but on which his entire project depends.   
“Synthesis,” Kant writes, “is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind 
but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge 
whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious” (A78/B103).  This power of 
imagination does not yield knowledge, but it does synthesize the manifold of the 
intuition with the concepts of the understanding (A79/B104).26  It is the concepts though, 
Kant believes, that actually make knowledge possible (i.e., they are how the 
understanding “thinks” an object of intuition (A80/B106)) and these he goes on to 
elaborate in the following pages.  The means by which knowledge takes place, however, 
is the synthesis which depends on the power of the imagination.  Freydberg writes, “The 
imagination is not merely the middle term of the three [thought, intuition, and 
imagination], but the power that allows all three terms (including its own) to come 
forth.”27  Without this synthesis the two disparate faculties of the mind would remain 
divided.  Thus, since Kant’s Copernican turn is dependent on the categories making rules 
for the intuition, the nature of this synthesis is a crucial aspect of his project.  
In the A-Deduction Kant suggests that “sense, imagination, and apperception” 
are the three subjective sources of knowledge without which experience and knowledge 
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27 Freydberg, Imagination and Depth, 53. 
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would not be possible (A115).  As noted above, the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
and the concepts is an essential aspect of Kant’s view.  He makes a pointed observation 
at the beginning of the A-deduction: “That a concept, although itself neither contained in 
the concept of possible experience nor consisting of elements of a possible experience, 
should be produced completely a priori and should relate to an object, is altogether 
contradictory and impossible” (A95).  This, of course, is due to Kant’s belief that 
concepts need percepts and percepts need concepts.  The disparity of the faculties 
becomes readily apparent at this juncture—a point which Freydberg suggests actually 
makes Kant’s work all the more difficult.28  Kant goes on to argue though that the pure 
aspects of the categories (i.e., those aspects that contain nothing from experience) 
actually make the experience of an object possible and that this, in turn, is sufficient for 
a “deduction” (A97).  But knowledge is a whole and therefore depends upon all three 
sources and therefore this deduction hinges, Kant believes, on the unity of apperception 
(A110).   
   Kant thinks that it is simply an “empirical law” that we can associate various 
representations in accordance with a fixed rule and the faculty which accomplishes this 
is the imagination (A101-102).  Kant labels this particular function of the imagination 
the “reproductive imagination” because it simply reproduces representations from the 
manifold of the intuition.  It has an a priori grounding, however, because it does not 
simply associate random representations, but rather associates them in an orderly 
manner.  This reproductive synthesis of the imagination Kant includes as one of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 56. 
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transcendental acts of the mind which contributes to the ground of any knowledge 
whatsoever (A102).29   
When considering the three sources of knowledge together Kant includes the 
imagination as one of the elements which makes empirical knowledge possible.  He 
believes that for intuitions to be taken up into consciousness we must have a sense of 
unity or self (apperception) which serves as a necessary condition for even the 
possibility of representations (A116).  This very unity however involves a synthesis 
which, as noted above, is a power of the imagination.  Kant can conclude therefore that 
“the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior 
to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of 
experience” (A118).  It follows, then that since the unity of apperception is necessary for 
knowledge, and the synthesis of imagination is necessary for the unity of apperception, 
the synthesis of imagination is necessary if we are to have any empirical knowledge at 
all.  In so far as the imagination serves as the a priori grounds for the unity of 
apperception it too is a pure faculty of the mind.  Indeed, Kant believes that it is “one of 
the fundamental faculties of the human soul” which serves to connect the manifold of 
intuition with pure apperception.  In short, since Kant has already stated that concepts 
without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind, he needs a way to 
connect these two disparate aspects of the human mind and the imagination performs 
this function because without it “the [sensibility], though indeed yielding appearances, 
                                                 
29 J. Michael Young suggests that the imagination should not be equated with the 
sensibility.  See his, “Kant’s View of Imagination,” Kant-Studien (79. Jahrgang, Heft 2), 
1988: 147. 
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would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience” 
(A124). 
This result is of no small significance for Kant.  If we can have a priori grounds 
for the unity of our experiences we can explain how it is the Copernican turn may be 
completed.  That is, through this deduction Kant is suggesting that it is not nature that 
introduces regularities to our mind, but rather “the order and regularity in the 
appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce” (A125).  Without the 
synthesis of the imagination therefore, the understanding would be cut off from nature 
and unable to impose its laws.  As Deleuze writes, “The imagination embodies the 
mediation, brings about the synthesis which relates phenomena to the understanding as 
the only faculty which legislates in the interest of knowledge.”30      
The B-deduction seemingly presents the imagination in a different guise.  There 
Kant remarks that the imagination “is the faculty of representing in intuition an object 
that is not itself present” and that it “belongs to the sensibility” given that all of our 
intuition is sensible (B151).31 He also remarks that it is an expression of spontaneity 
(understanding) and is thus “able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in 
accordance with the unity of apperception . . .” (B151-152). He thus makes a distinction 
between the productive imagination (a priori spontaneity) and the reproductive 
imagination (subject to empirical laws), both of which are necessary to connect the 
sensibility and the understanding.  The imagination connects the manifold of sensible 
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intuition, but at the same time, is dependent for its unity on the understanding. On the 
one hand, the imagination “is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon 
the understanding” while on the other it is dependent “for the manifoldness of its 
apprehension upon sensibility” (B164). This is merely an extension of Kant’s more 
general purpose in the B-deduction which is to show that objects cannot be thought 
without the categories.  The imagination therefore in the B-Deduction seems deeply 
dependent upon the heterogeneous faculties which it labors to unite.32 
There appears to be a somewhat different picture of the imagination between the 
A- and B-deductions.  Indeed, this fuels a major criticism of Kant’s project that will be 
discussed below.  On the face of it, the A-deduction seems to present the imagination as 
a distinct faculty that works alongside the faculties of the sensibility and the 
understanding in order to provide unity to the faculties and hence, order and regularity in 
nature (A125).  The B-deduction, on the other hand, seems to suppress the imagination’s 
autonomous function—it fades into the background, only making an appearance to 
connect the manifold of intuition and for itself to be unified by intellectual synthesis 
(B164-165).  I wish to suggest, however, that this apparent disparity (or ambivalence) 
points to the further development of Kant’s first Critique.  He has deduced the 
categories, but now he needs to show the means by which they apply to the sensibility—
for this he needs to further elaborate on the function of judgment—the means by which 
synthesis is enacted.  The second task Kant introduces in the Transcendental Doctrine of 
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and Deleuze, 17.  I am indebted to Freydberg for this point.  See Freydberg, 85-86, n. 4. 
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Elements, therefore, is to discover the means by which appearances apply to the 
concepts of the understanding.  This is done, as he has already indicated, by judgment.  
Thus, in the Analytic of Principles, Kant seeks to discover the conditions under which an 
object can be subsumed under one category or another (A177/B138).  This process he 
entitles Schematism which, as we shall see, intricately involves the imagination. 
Kant has already shown that concepts are necessary to think objects of 
experience, but at this point the means by which this takes place remains hidden from 
view. In order for these two heterogeneous faculties to combine for certain knowledge, 
there must be some “third thing” which is both homogeneous with the concept and with 
the appearance—it must be both intellectual and sensible.  Such a representation Kant 
titles the “transcendental schema” which is a “transcendental time determination” since 
time is a condition for intuition and determination proceeds according to a rule as do the 
categories.  The application of appearance to category, therefore, takes place because the 
transcendental schema is heterogeneous with both intuition and understanding. 
There are two parts to the transcendental schema, but it is always a product of the 
imagination.  On the one hand, the schema—which are the formal conditions of the 
sensibility—provide an image for a concept.  This use of the word “image” should not 
be taken in the strict sense, but rather in a more general sense.  That is, the schema must 
apply to both the concepts of the understanding and the intuition and therefore must be 
compatible with both, but identical with neither.33  Kant makes it clear that these 
“images” are representations whereby the manifold of intuition might be applied to 
                                                 
33 For a detailed discussion on this point see Allison, 220-221 and 225-229. 
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concepts in general.  Thus, “this thought is rather the representation of a method 
whereby a multiplicity, for instance a thousand, may be represented in an image in 
conformity with a certain concept, than the image itself” (A140/B179).  On the other 
hand, the synthesis of the imagination with respect to pure figures, Kant entitles 
“schematism of pure understanding.”  This aspect of the Schematism can only exist in 
thought and is a product of the pure a priori imagination.  Hence, images can only be 
connected with concepts via the schemata and the schema of a pure concept can only be 
brought to an image by a “pure synthesis, determined by a rule of that unity, in 
accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression” (A142/B181).   
Surprisingly, however, the Schematism remains partially concealed from our 
view.  Kant maintains that this function of the human mind is “an art concealed in the 
depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to 
allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze” (A141/B181).  Despite the fact that 
there must be a connection between the two disparate faculties of the human mind, and 
that this disparity, Kant believes, requires a “third thing” to mediate between them, this 
third thing, this Schematism, this product of the imagination remains a mysterious aspect 
of the human mind.  Kant later echoes this sentiment in the Transcendental Dialectic 
when he maintains that the products of the imagination are blurry, shadowy, 
representations which are not determined by a particular rule (A570/B598).  We are thus 
privy to what the imagination must do—it must be a time-determination, because that is 
what the forms of each faculty require.  We are not, however, privy to what it does in 
fact do.  The Schematism, and therefore, the imagination remain partially eclipsed from 
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our view.  We know it is there.  Indeed, it must be there.  But we are unable to see it 
clearly. 
This schematism, however, is absolutely crucial to Kant’s project.  If the gap 
between these two disparate faculties of the human mind cannot be bridged, the 
prospects for knowledge of things become rather bleak.  Kant concludes the section on 
the schematism by claiming the following: 
The categories without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for 
concepts; and represent no object.  This [objective] meaning they acquire from 
sensibility, which realizes the understanding in the very process of restricting it 
(A147/B187). 
 
This shows that the Schematism, and therefore the imagination, is essential to Kant’s 
belief that the two faculties of the human mind can be mediated.  Without the 
Schematism the deduction of the categories would be impossible since while it might be 
necessary for objects to be thought by concepts, concepts would not have the means by 
which they could be applied to those objects.  Furthermore, Kant’s dictum that “thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” would itself be an 
empty generalization, for there would be no means by which their interdependence could 
be displayed.  In short, the Copernican turn itself, as Kant conceives it, would fail to get 
off the ground without the imagination—the hypothesis that objects must conform to our 
knowledge would be nothing more than that, a hypothesis.  Heidegger will take this a 
step further and claim that not only is the imagination central to Kant’s project, it also 





 As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Kant has many critics.  One critic in 
particular, Martin Heidegger, has focused his work on Kant’s conception of the 
imagination in the first Critique.  Heidegger believes that the imagination should be 
understood as a faculty in its own right rather than being simply a function that links the 
understanding and the sensibility.  Moreover, he claims that these two faculties are stems 
of which the imagination is the root.  He writes, “The transcendental power of 
imagination is hence the ground upon which the inner possibility of ontological 
knowledge, and with it that of Metaphysica Generalis, is built.”34  Indeed, the whole 
Kantian project, Heidegger thinks “leads to the power of the imagination” and, 
ultimately, to the ground of the transcendental power of the imagination, namely, time.35  
According to the first Critique, however, especially in the second edition, Heidegger 
suggests that Kant “shrank back” from this belief and attempted to present the 
imagination as a subordinate portion of the understanding.  He argues that this shrinking 
back results in a searching for human finitude in pure rationality rather than in sensibility 
where Heidegger thinks it belongs.36  Hence, Heidegger offers a re-interpretation of what 
Kant had “wanted to say” by setting before us that which remains unsaid “in and through 
what has been said.”37   
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Heidegger begins by pointing out that, for Kant, the laying of the groundwork for 
metaphysics is the answer to the question of the unity of ontological knowledge and 
determining what is the ground of its possibility.  He notes that while the imagination is 
given a central role in the Schematism, it did not originate there, for Kant used the 
doctrine of the imagination in the Transcendental Deduction.  This usage, Heidegger 
suggests, highlights “in a much more original way” the mediating role the imagination 
plays between the sensibility and the understanding than some of Kant’s earlier lectures 
had.  The Schematism also suggests a more “creative” function of the power of the 
imagination.  These considerations lead Heidegger to believe that “the pure productive 
power of imagination, free of experience, makes experience possible for the first time.”38   
Heidegger believes that understood in this way the imagination should not be 
thought of as a mere mediating faculty between the understanding and the sensibility, 
but rather as a “basic ability to do something,” namely, the ability to make possible the 
unity between the two faculties and to be “the essential unity of transcendence as a 
whole.”39  Nevertheless, he points out that the imagination remains “homeless” in the 
first Critique—only receiving treatment here and there when necessary.  Heidegger 
believes, however, that a proper interpretation of Kant’s “ground-laying” shows that the 
imagination is indeed a third faculty which is no mere “bond which fastens together two 
ends,” but is, on the contrary, an “originally unifying” common root to both.40 
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Having established the imagination as the unifying root of the possibility of both 
the understanding and the sensibility, Heidegger develops what he means by this with 
respect to each individual faculty.  He claims that the transcendental power of the 
imagination provides the means by which the pure intuition can be what it “‘really’ can 
be.”41  Since pure intuitions are by their very nature “original” or a “springing forth,” the 
pure power of the imagination is realized in these presentations because it “formatively 
gives looks (images) from out of itself.”42  In other words, the formation of the images in 
intuition is original because it is a priori and thus not based on previous experience, but 
rather on the various patterns of the imagination.    
On the other hand, that the understanding is likewise formed from the 
imagination proves more problematic for Heidegger, for given that the two faculties—
understanding and sensibility—are heterogeneous, how is it that they share a common 
root?  Heidegger believes that the answer to this question is that the nature of the 
understanding, its very essence, is that it is dependent upon the intuition.43  That is, since 
the understanding represents from within the Schematism and the Schematism is a 
product of the imagination and the imagination is that which gives rise to the intuition, 
the understanding is thus organically linked with the intuition.  Hence, Heidegger thinks 
that the understanding does not produce the schemata, but that the Schematism 
constitutes the “original Being of the understanding” and that original thinking is 
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therefore pure imagining while the understanding considered as a “taking in stride of 
what gives itself” is pure intuition.44  It is in this way, Heidegger thinks, that both the 
intuition and the understanding find their root in the imagination. 
Heidegger recognizes that this interpretation is not consistent with Kant’s 
presentation of the Transcendental Deduction particularly with respect to the second 
edition.  Nevertheless, Heidegger wishes to show that the second edition thrust the 
imagination from the “impassioned course of its first projection” and re-interpreted it as 
a function, not as a ground, of the understanding.45  The imagination on this view 
becomes limited to a mere effect of the understanding on the sensibility.  Heidegger 
believes therefore that Kant re-interpreted the imagination because it confronted him 
with the unknown and “frightened him” to such a degree that he fell under the spell of 
“pure reason as reason” and that this pushed aside the power of the imagination “and 
with that it really first [concealed] its transcendental essence.”46  In short, Heidegger 
thinks that by re-interpreting the imagination as a function of the understanding, Kant 
drew back from that which is unknown and thereby diminished the possibility of 
explaining how the two heterogeneous faculties can be united in a finite human being 
and that his (Heidegger’s) interpretation brings out what Kant “had wanted to say.”47 
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Heidegger’s account shows Kant’s critical philosophy to be radical to a certain 
extent.  It suggests that initially Kant believed that knowledge depends upon the 
operation of the imagination in so far as the imagination proves to be the root faculty of 
which the sensibility and the understanding are the stems.  This radicality ceases, 
however, when Kant reformulates the deduction of the categories in the second edition 
of the first Critique.  Heidegger believes that at this point Kant loses faith—he 
surrenders his radical philosophy to the safety of the ever-constant categories of the 
understanding.   
Heidegger may be right, but it seems that, based on what I have shown above, 
Kant does not present the whole picture of the imagination in the first Critique and 
therefore addresses some of the concerns Heidegger wishes to approach.  First, as far as 
the language of the B-deduction is concerned, it is not clear that Kant “recoils” from his 
earlier position.  Recall that the imagination, as Kant expresses it in the B-deduction, is 
that faculty which represents an object in intuition that is not itself present (B151).  In 
this sense, Kant notes, it “belongs to sensibility.”  In so far as the imagination forms a 
synthesis which determines sense, however, it is “an action of the understanding” 
(B152).  Furthermore, recall that all synthesis is subject to the categories (B161).  This 
seems to indicate that the imagination is not an independent faculty from which the other 
two faculties spring.  I believe, however, that this is an overly ambitious claim.  Granted, 
as Freydberg points out, “Kant’s language stands in a dissonant relationship with itself 
with respect to the imagination,” but it does not follow from this that the imagination can 
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no longer be understood as the root from which the other two faculties stem.48  On the 
contrary, the synthesis of both the manifold of intuition and the understanding are 
transcendental which means that they condition “the possibility of other a priori 
knowledge” (B151).  Consistent with this Rudolf Makkreel suggests that the imagination 
is subservient to the understanding only in so far as it synthesizes.49  Perhaps it is in this 
way that the sensibility and the understanding are, to use Freydberg’s phrase, 
“afterimages of imagination’s work.”50  The imagination, on this angle of vision, 
therefore seems to present possibilities that go beyond Heidegger in so far as he did not 
allow the radical nature of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination to spring forth from the B-
deduction. 
Second, as I pointed out above by quoting Freydberg, Kant’s language does 
reveal a dissonance which he fails to eradicate from the second edition of the first 
Critique.  Heidegger is certainly correct to point out this disharmony, but even so, 
perhaps there is more in Kant’s text than Heidegger could see.  Even granting this 
disharmony, Kant tells us that the sensibility and the understanding can only be 
connected by means of a schema which is dependent on the imagination.  Thus, whether 
or not there is disharmony in the B-deduction, the very conditions under which the 
understanding and the sensibility can operate depend on the imagination.  The 
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conclusion that the imagination is subservient to the understanding is, therefore, not 
necessarily global, i.e., it cannot be stated without qualification.  In fact, in this instance 
it appears that the imagination remains the root of the two faculties of the human mind 
and that Kant has not abandoned his earlier position—the imagination is crucial for the 
synthesis of the two disparate faculties and thus still crucial for Kant’s Copernican turn.  
In these two ways Kant’s view seems to indicate radical possibilities that have not yet 
been realized—at least by Heidegger. 
The Imagination Beyond the First Critique 
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that Kant’s philosophy is radical and 
resilient.  It is radical in that it proposes a dramatic shift from the belief that our 
knowledge depends on objects to the belief that, on the contrary, objects depend on our 
knowledge of them.  Kant unfurls this Copernican turn in his first Critique.   What 
makes this even more radical is that he believes that the linchpin for this turn is the 
imagination.  Hence, the unfurling of the Copernican turn is the unfurling of the work of 
the imagination.  Kant’s philosophy is resilient because it continually eludes critics—
proving to be, in some sense, still beyond their horizons.  Despite this resilience, 
however, the questions with which this chapter began have still yet to be answered.  I 
pointed out that while Kant takes the Copernican turn and radically suggests that the 
imagination is crucial to this turn, he nevertheless does this obliquely.  This obliquity 
remains at the end of the Schematism when he asserts that the actual workings of the 
imagination through the schema will perhaps never be revealed.  Indeed, this partial 
eclipse of the imagination gives rise to Heidegger’s criticism.  On the other hand, this 
 33 
partial eclipse points beyond itself.  It raises further questions.  It raises again the 
questions with which this chapter began: If the imagination is partially eclipsed, where is 
it revealed?  When it is revealed, how does it illuminate Kant’s constructivism?  For 


























The Third Critique finds its decisive concerns neither in questions of beauty nor 
in questions of empirical biology, but rather in the ultimate questions of the place 
of man in the order of the world—his freedom and his destiny. 
 
—John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
 
 In the previous chapter I suggested that Kant’s Copernican turn depends crucially 
on his doctrine of the imagination.  I argued that while the imagination is not clearly 
revealed in the Critique of Pure Reason, it nevertheless provides the necessary means by 
which the two disparate faculties of the understanding and the sensibility can be 
synthesized.  Thus, the motivating question with which I began my previous chapter 
went unanswered.  The question was, What exactly is Kant’s constructivism and why 
should it be considered radical?  I suggested that while the imagination does in fact play 
a crucial role in Kant’s constructivism, Kant’s formulation of the means by which the 
synthesis of the two faculties takes place obscures the underlying significance of the 
imagination.   
 The Critique of the Power of Judgment elaborates further on the radical nature of 
the imagination for Kant’s critical philosophy.  In this work the imagination is presented 
as a spontaneous faculty of the mind which works in free harmony with the 
understanding to yield judgments of beauty.   In this chapter I will argue that Kant’s 
doctrine of the imagination in the third Critique is truly radical because it is the means 
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by which nature is revealed as purposive.  First, I will point out that Kant’s main aim in 
the third Critique is to investigate the limits and possibilities of purposive thinking.  To 
this end I will show that he expands the faculty of judgment as reflective in addition to 
the determinate judgments of the first Critique.  Second, since Kant believes that it is in 
judgments of beauty that purposive thinking is revealed, I will argue that this leads to a 
new sense of the imagination for the critical philosophy.  I will point out that these 
judgments arise from a free play between the imagination and the understanding, a 
relationship that Kant did not articulate in the first Critique.  Finally, I will argue that 
Kant’s notion of the imagination in the third Critique represents the symbolic use of 
reflective judgments and this points the way to answering the question posed in Chapter 
II: What exactly is Kant’s constructivism and why should it be considered radical?  I will 
suggest that Kant’s doctrine of the imagination reveals a radical constructivism through 
the symbolic work of the imagination whereby aesthetic ideas provide the means by 
which our concepts and experience of nature are expanded and enriched. 
Purposivity and Reflection in the Third Critique 
 Ernst Cassirer points out that Kant’s main concern in the third Critique is to 
discover how the faculties of the mind make purposive judgments.51  John Zammito 
similarly claims “The Third Critique finds its decisive concerns neither in questions of 
beauty nor in questions of empirical biology, but rather in the ultimate questions of the 
place of man in the order of the world—his freedom and his destiny.”52  These claims 
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are substantiated in the First Introduction to the third Critique where Kant maintains that 
purposiveness can only be ascribed to nature in relation to the power of judgment.53  
That is, it is only through the ability of the human faculty of judgment that our 
experiences of nature and beauty reflect a certain unity and order.  Furthermore, Kant 
also claims in the First Introduction that the means by which this purposiveness is 
perceived requires the harmony of the imagination and the understanding.  Thus, in order 
to have a purposive experience of nature and beauty the imagination is required, but this 
purpose is not found in the objects themselves.  Rather, consistent with Kant’s 
Copernican turn, the purposivity of nature is a result of the harmony of the faculties of 
our mind. 
 Kant believes that the power of judgment is an original power of cognition.  He 
begins the First Introduction to his third Critique by stating that the systematic 
representation of the faculty of thinking is threefold: the understanding represents the 
means by which rules are applied, the faculty of reason determines the particular through 
the general, and the power of judgment subsumes the particular under the general.54  It 
should follow from this, Kant thinks, that judgments provide some kind of ground for a 
special part of philosophy since laws of nature do this in the case of concepts and laws of 
freedom do this in the case of ideas.  What the faculty of judgment does, however, is 
                                                                                                                                                
 52 John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 342. 
 53 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of the Power of Judgment, The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer & Allen Wood, gen. eds., trans. 
Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 24 (20: 
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provide a “concept of a purposiveness of nature in behalf of our faculty for cognizing it . 
. .”55  The faculty of judgment provides a law or a rule similar to the understanding and 
reason, but it is not a law or a rule in the same sense.  Given that the faculty of judgment 
serves to subsume given concepts under general rules, it cannot provide concepts itself, 
yet Kant believes that something original does arise from the power of judgment.56   
 Judgment, Kant believes, concerns the purposivity of experience.  The originality 
that arises from the faculty of judgment is altogether foreign to the understanding 
because, for example, while the understanding contains transcendental laws for 
cognizing experience in general, the vast number of empirical laws, in all their 
particularity, do not follow with any necessity (or any possibility for that matter) from 
such general laws.  To use Cassirer’s illustration, according to the general concepts of 
cognition, one can know that causality occurs in nature, but one cannot determine each 
particular instance in which it occurs.  The concepts of the first Critique are sufficient to 
determine that causality occurs, but it does not extend to each and every instance of 
causality.57  Furthermore, because the power of judgment does not give rise to concepts 
or ideas and because its main function is to subsume the particular under the general 
which is given beforehand, the originality of the power of judgment is that things in 
nature cannot be formed unless their “arrangement conforms to our faculty for 
subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even though these are not 
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given . . .”58 Kant calls this “a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to 
our power of judgment.”59  Hence, the originality, which arises from the power of 
judgment, is that of a system of particular empirical laws and, as he will later put it with 
respect to judgments of beauty, purposivity without purpose.60   
 Consequently, judgments are not conditioned upon the objects that are judged, 
but rather on the cognizing subject. The purposiveness of nature therefore is that nature 
is discovered as a “systematic interconnection of empirical laws” which must be 
conformable to the faculty which takes these particular laws and subsumes them under 
more general rules and this is precisely the function of the power of judgment. 61  Kant 
believes that purposiveness must be assumed of nature because without it no experience 
of unified particular laws of nature would be available to us—we expect to find the 
interconnection of empirical laws in nature.62  However, the formal purposiveness in 
nature, which we assume a priori, provides a principle for judging our investigation of 
nature by moving from particular observations to more general laws.  Kant believes, 
therefore, to use Cassirer’s phrasing, that we approach the system of nature not as 
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legislators, but rather as questioners and inquirers.63  That is, when we attempt to 
understand nature as a whole, we do not apply the general concepts of the understanding 
as legislators, but rather we presume that nature will conform to our judgments, that the 
particular will be able to be subsumed under the more general rules.  Only these rules are 
not given in this experience, but must be sought through the power of judgment.  Kant 
concludes, therefore, that this “presupposition is the transcendental principle of the 
power of judgment.”64  Indeed, the unity of our experience in general (and aesthetic 
experience in particular) depends on this notion of purposiveness.65  
 It should be noted, however, that this view of judgment supplements—expands 
on—not replaces Kant’s main arguments in the first Critique.  The conditions for 
experience in general are still only available through a deduction of the categories of 
pure reason.  What Kant is doing here is moving beyond the generalities of the first 
Critique in order to understand the whole of our experience of nature while still 
maintaining the conditions for knowledge in general.  What Kant has established in the 
First Introduction is that the purposiveness does not lie in things themselves, but rather 
in the conformability of the system of empirical laws to our faculty of judgment and, as 
we will see below, the pleasure of the mutual agreement of the imagination and the 
understanding.  Hence, Kant maintains the tenets of his Copernican turn (that objects of 
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knowledge conform to our knowledge rather than vice versa) while at the same time 
extending this principle to our experience of nature in all its particularity.  As Cassirer 
puts it, “Following its fundamental tendency [the critical standpoint] works not so much 
toward the form of actuality itself but toward the form of our concepts of the actual; the 
system of these concepts, not the system of the world, constitutes its starting point.”66  
The notion of purposivity, however, develops Kant’s key insight in terms of the 
construction of nature in all its particularity, rather than the mere general laws of our 
understanding, generating an ever-expanding territory for his Copernican turn. 
 Many Kant scholars agree that a key development in Kant’s critical philosophy is 
his focus on reflective judgments in the third Critique.67  In the first Critique, as I 
pointed out in Chapter II, Kant speaks of judgments in their determinate (or constitutive) 
form.  Determinate judgments are those which begin with a rule or a concept and 
subsume particulars under more general rules.  As I noted in Chapter II, this act of 
judgment is, crucially, a work of the imagination.  The imagination, however, fulfils its 
function through the schemata by which concepts are made ready to match up with 
intuitions.68  By contrast, reflective judgments, as Kant discusses them in the third 
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Critique, begin with particular experiences of nature and look for concepts under which 
those experiences might be subsumed.  He famously writes: 
The power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as 
contained under the universal.  If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is 
given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it . . . is 
determining.  If, however, only the particular is given, for which the universal is 
to be found, then the power of judgment is merely reflecting. 69 
 
As has been noted above, however, the laws of nature are too many to be given by the 
concepts of the understanding and therefore it is necessary to presuppose a 
purposiveness within nature with respect to our faculty of judgment.  Moreover, this 
presupposition is grounded by the faculty of the power of reflective judgment which 
moves from the particular to the more general.  
  Reflection, Kant wishes to show, “is to compare and to hold together given 
representations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a 
concept thereby made possible.”70  Thus the reflective power of judgment requires a 
principle so that it does not become “arbitrary and blind.”  This principle, Kant thinks, is 
that for every particular a determinate concept can be found.  This follows from his view 
that we must presuppose “nature has observed a certain economy suitable to our power 
of judgment and a uniformity that we can grasp” and that the comparison (reflection) of 
the empirical laws of nature and empirical representations must be preceded by this 
presumption.71   
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 Here Kant makes another key distinction between determinate judgments as he 
conceived them in the first Critique and reflective judgments.  Whereas the concepts of 
determinate judgments were applied to intuitions schematically, given appearances of 
reflective judgments are brought under empirical concepts technically or artistically in 
accordance with the purposive arrangement of nature.  Kant argues that the system of 
nature which accords with our power of judgment involves a “classification of the 
manifold” whereby the genus is specified by comparing the various classes of a 
determinate concept until the appropriate concept is found.72  He suggests that this 
movement of nature by comparison of particulars with the various classes of empirical 
concepts is an artistic movement and that nature, therefore, should also be regarded as 
artistic. 
 Accordingly, Kant believes the purposiveness of nature is not found in the forms 
of nature themselves, but rather purposiveness is revealed subjectively through the 
capacity for reflection.73  According to Kant, an aesthetic judgment of reflection is 
formed when the imagination agrees mutually with the understanding “for the 
advancement of their business.”74  They must agree mutually because in reflective 
judgments no concept is specified and thus the imagination plays a mutual role to the 
understanding rather than a merely subordinate one.  Moreover, reflecting judgments are 
aesthetic judgments in which the imagination and the understanding are held in 
                                                 
 72 Kant refers to this as the “highest genus.”  See, Ibid., 18, (20: 214). 
  
 73 Ibid., 19, (20: 216) & 21, (20: 218). 
  
 74 Ibid., 23, (20: 221). 
 43 
relationship by the power of judgment.75  This relationship produces a feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure which serves as the ground for aesthetic judgments in general.  
Thus, the determining ground for aesthetic judgments is the “harmonious play of the two 
faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding . . .”76 
This grounding is also a subjective grounding because it is made without the 
specification of a concept.     
 What is significant about this outline of Kant’s view of reflective/aesthetic 
judgments for the purposes of this chapter is that in them the imagination receives a new 
function, one which differs from its function in the first Critique. In reflective judgments 
the imagination does not serve the understanding in a subordinate way, but rather in a 
mutual relationship of free play.  This free play produces a sensation of pleasure and 
pain which serves as the ground for aesthetic judgments.  Thus, our particular 
experiences of nature and beauty, which are too many to be specified by the concepts of 
the understanding, find their grounding in reflective judgments, which in turn find their 
grounding in the free play of the understanding and the imagination.  Reflective 
judgments, therefore, are crucial for the purposiveness of nature and beauty, for without 
them neither the interconnectedness of experience nor the beauty of a sunset would be 
possible at all.77 
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 The point of the foregoing discussion has been to suggest that reflective 
judgments are a radical and significant development of Kant’s critical philosophy.  
Lurking in this discussion, it turns out, are some rather controversial claims about the 
systamaticity of the third Critique if not properly qualified.  Essentially, what Kant 
seems to be suggesting in the First Introduction is that reflective judgments in general 
reveal the connection of empirical laws.  As the third Critique unfolds, however, it is 
less clear precisely how Kant believes the connection should be made between 
teleological judgments and judgments of beauty.78  My purpose, therefore, will be to 
focus, not on teleological judgments, but rather on judgments of beauty because it is 
with respect to these judgments that Kant most clearly reveals the freedom and 
spontaneity of the imagination, which we shall see below.   
 At least two significant points may be suggested here.  First, Kant is determined 
to go beyond the “arbitrary and blind” work of the reflective power of judgment.  As I 
pointed out in Chapter II, Kant left the nature of the work of the imagination in the 
Schematism partially hidden from view claiming that nature might never reveal its 
secrets.  In the third Critique, however, he is more willing (or more able) to radicalize 
the seemingly blind and arbitrary work of reflective judgment in order to establish a 
principle upon which the purposiveness of aesthetic experience might be grounded.  
Second, just as the imagination functioned as the linchpin for determinate judgments in 
the first Critique, they also function as crucial aspects of reflective judgments, 
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particularly judgments of beauty, in the third Critique.  Consequently, the question can 
be raised: If the reflective judgments of the third Critique differ from the determinate 
judgments of the first Critique, might Kant’s doctrine of the imagination also differ in a 
similar way?  The answer to this question must be pursued in the Analytic of the 
Beautiful where Kant’s notion of the imagination is most prominent.  The following 
discussion, therefore, will focus on judgments of beauty rather than teleological 
judgments because, as will hopefully become clear, it is in these judgments that Kant 
reveals the imagination in a radical and dynamic way. 
Reflective Judgment and the Free Play of the Imagination 
 In this section I will point out that the imagination in the third Critique develops 
into a faculty that is more dynamic than the imagination in the first Critique.  This can 
be seen in Kant’s notion of the free play of the understanding and the imagination with 
respect to judgments of beauty.  Kant has said that aesthetic judgments are grounded in 
pleasure and displeasure.  That is, in the agreement or disagreement of the imagination 
and the understanding, a judgment of beauty is made with respect to the form of the 
representation.   That this judgment of beauty is made with respect to the form of the 
representation indicates that this judgment is universal even though it is not specified by 
a concept of the understanding.  This notion of the universality of judgments of taste, 
therefore, is in need of a critique.  What needs further elaboration at this point is how 
these judgments can be universally valid since they are particular judgments of pleasure 
and displeasure which are subjective.79  Kant seeks to ground these judgments in the 
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Analytic of the Beautiful, which unfolds as a series of four moments in accordance with 
the four kinds of judgments he describes in the first Critique.80 
 To be clear, universally valid judgments of taste require a critique because, as 
reflective judgments, they are related to sensation and are therefore subjective since they 
are not determined by any concept.  These judgments of beauty, however, are made as 
universal judgments—when something is judged as beautiful, it is judged as beautiful for 
everyone.  Thus, Kant wishes to show in the Analytic of the Beautiful the conditions 
under which these universally valid judgments of beauty can be made.      
 In this section I will limit my discussion to the aspects of the Analytic of the 
Beautiful in which Kant specifically draws on his ideas about the imagination.  This is 
partly due to the scope of my chapter and partly due to the fact that I have already 
argued that the imagination is a central aspect to Kant’s development of reflective 
judgments in general and am here merely explicating how this central aspect of his 
thought unfolds.  The most important passage for this discussion is §9 in which Kant 
argues that judgments must precede the feeling of pleasure in judgments of taste. 
 Kant begins §9 by arguing that if judgments of taste are universally valid, then it 
would be a contradiction to claim that the pleasure in the given object came before the 
judgment had been made.  The reason for this is that placing pleasure before the 
judgment places its validity in the merely subjective sphere because it immediately 
depends on the empirical “representation through which the object is given.”81  Kant has 
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already argued, however, (in §6) that the only way one can make judgments of beauty 
(as opposed to the agreeable) is by supposing that “it [the judgment of beauty] must 
contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone.”82  Moreover, these judgments must also 
be subjective.  Kant explains: “ . . . the aesthetic universality that is ascribed to a 
judgment must also be of a special kind, since the predicate of beauty is not connected 
with the concept of the object considered in its entire logical sphere, and yet it extends it 
over the whole sphere of those who judge.”83  Thus, to be warranted in claiming that 
pleasure comes first would be denying that there can be universally valid judgments of 
beauty.  If Kant were to allow this, he would be going back on his radical claims about 
universal subjective judgments of beauty and on the nature of reflective judgments 
discussed above. 
 Kant asserts therefore that pleasure itself cannot be universally communicated.  If 
he is to proceed he must explain the conditions under which judgments precede the 
pleasure which follows.  The grounds for the judgment of taste, he therefore suggests, 
must be in “the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the 
given representation” and not the pleasure that results from this state.84  This puts Kant 
in somewhat of an awkward situation, for he has just claimed that a “state of mind” is 
universally communicable, but he has also claimed that the only things that are 
universally communicable are “cognition and representation so far as it belongs to 
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cognition.”85  Pleasure, he maintains, is entirely subjective and therefore can only give 
“private validity” or “agreeableness” and yet universal judgments of beauty require 
pleasure in order to be experienced.86 
 Kant believes, therefore, that the “feeling of free play of the powers of 
representation” is the subjective universally communicable aspect of judgments of 
taste.87  This is his solution to the above dilemma which leads to one of his most 
significant claims about the imagination in the third Critique.  He claims that the 
universal communicability of the representation is the “the state of mind that is 
encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they 
relate a given representation to cognition in general.”88  The powers that are in 
relationship here are the imagination and the understanding which are in a relationship of 
“free play” because there is no determinate concept restricting them to a particular rule 
of cognition.  This feeling of pleasure, of course, arises from the agreement of the two 
faculties and not their disagreement.89  It is this agreement upon which—along with the 
representation of the object—our claims of beauty are grounded and thus without this 
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feeling, Kant believes, there is no beauty.90  That is, Kant’s claim is that without the 
“free play” of the imagination and the understanding, beauty cannot be experienced. 
 One key aspect of this relationship between the imagination and the 
understanding is that the two powers are in “free play,” which reveals that rather than the 
imagination being subservient to the understanding it is in a reciprocal relationship to it.  
Kant insists that this relationship cannot be a concept which somehow unites the 
understanding and the imagination because then the relationship would be intellectual or 
schematic as in the first Critique and would therefore not be a judgment of taste since it 
determines an object in accordance with a concept.91  On the contrary, judgments of taste 
are made based on satisfaction and are thus made via sensation which can only be 
universally communicated through the play of the imagination and the understanding 
which are “enlivened through mutual agreement.”92  Moreover, Kant goes on to claim, in 
the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments, that the subjective condition of all 
judgments requires the “agreement” of the imagination and the understanding.  He 
explains that what he means by this is that the “freedom of the imagination consists 
precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept . . .” and that it follows from 
this that “ . . . the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally 
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animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness . . .”93 
 What is significant about these claims for the purposes of this chapter is that 
Kant’s notion of free play puts the imagination in a reciprocal rather than subservient 
role to the faculty of the understanding.  The whole notion of judgments of beauty are 
conditioned on the fact that the imagination must interact freely, mutually, and 
reciprocally with the imagination to provide subjective universally valid judgments of 
beauty.  As Gilles Deleuze points out, this gives rise to an aesthetic common sense 
grounded on “a pure subjective harmony where imagination and understanding are 
exercised spontaneously, each on its own account.”94 
 Recall that in Chapter II I argued that Kant’s notion of the imagination remained 
partially eclipsed from our view.  That is, I argued that in spite of the fact that Kant’s 
doctrine of the imagination is central to his Copernican turn, he nevertheless shrouds the 
radical nature of the imagination behind the capacity of the concepts of the 
understanding to legislate our experiences of nature.  Furthermore, in the Schematism, 
Kant conceded that the imagination schematizes, but only according to concepts.  Thus, 
Kant, in the first Critique, left the imagination in a subservient position to the 
understanding.  Recall also that at the end of Chapter II I made a promissory note that in 
the third Critique the truly radical nature of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination is made 
explicit.  This is precisely where the imagination is revealed for Kant—in the free play, 
the harmonious agreement, of the imagination and the faculty of the understanding as a 
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condition for subjective universally valid judgments of taste.  Indeed, in the third 
Critique Kant affirms that the imagination “schematizes without a concept” because it 
presents and suggests creative ways in which experiences of beauty might be 
understood.95  
 What this section suggests is that the imagination, precisely because it is not 
conceived as subservient to the understanding, makes judgments of beauty possible.  
Thus, reflective judgments in general require the free play of the imagination, an 
imagination that is not tethered to the determinate concepts of the understanding, but is 
rather in a mutually animating relationship with them.  It is in this way that the 
imagination in the third Critique is more radical than the imagination in the first 
Critique.  It is in this way that the imagination is revealed rather than eclipsed as it was 
in the first Critique, presenting us with a radical spontaneity of the imagination 
alongside the understanding.    
 The third Critique, therefore, reveals the imagination as free and spontaneous 
through reflective judgments of beauty.  This claim serves as the origin from which Kant 
moves beyond the conservative constraints of the concepts of the understanding.  
Presently, the most that can be substantiated is that the imagination provides the means 
by which judgments of beauty can be grounded a priori.  Kant, however, goes on to 
elaborate on the function of the imagination.  Of particular importance for the purposes 
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of this chapter are his notions of Aesthetic Ideas and the Symbolic function of the 
imagination. 
The Symbolic Imagination and Kant’s Constructivism 
 In the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, Kant sets up an antinomy 
between the subjectivity of judgments of taste and the universality of those judgments.  
The problem is that if judgments of taste are made subjectively, how is it possible for 
them to be universal claims of beauty (which we take them to be)?  He wishes to show 
that this antinomy can only be solved through the recognition that judgments of taste 
find their ground in reflective judgments which, although they are related to a concept, 
are not determined by that concept, but rather are based on an indeterminate concept.  
Hence, as Kant argued in the Analytic of the Beautiful, reflective judgments are those 
which are not determined by a concept, but rather are grounded by the harmonious play 
of the imagination and the understanding.  The antinomy, Kant believes, is therefore 
resolved and the subjective nature of judgments of taste can also be understood as 
universal judgments of taste.  Kant furthermore suggests that the purposiveness in nature 
is discovered aesthetically by the “correspondence of its representation in the 
imagination with the essential principles of the power of judgment in general.”96  As 
Cassirer puts it, “The artistic feeling remains a feeling of self, but precisely as such it is 
at the same time a universal feeling of the world and life.”97   
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 Kant goes on to make two significant points in the remaining portions of the 
Dialectic of the Beautiful.  The first point is that the imagination allows us to interact 
with nature by means of aesthetic ideas which Kant defines as representations of the 
imagination that allow unnamable additions to concepts.98  This can be seen most 
distinctly in beautiful art because it is considered to be a product of genius and finds its 
rule in the aesthetic ideas.99  The imagination, therefore, can be used to create “another 
nature, out of the material which the real one gives it.”100  In order to do this we must, of 
course, use “analogous laws,” but we are nonetheless able, Kant believes, to transform 
the material given to us by nature into “something entirely different, namely into that 
which steps beyond nature.”101  Hence, through the imagination and beautiful art not 
only we are able to experience nature, we can also creatively interact with nature through 
the transformation of the aesthetic ideas of the imagination.  In other words, the 
imagination allows us to construct the world creatively.   
 The imagination, in its creativity, can therefore “aesthetically enlarge” a concept 
by being presented alongside it and setting the intellectual ideas into motion.  The output 
of this creativity “gives more to think about than can be grasped and made distinct in it” 
and therefore cannot be made intelligible by language.102  As John Sallis writes, 
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“Aesthetic ideas are representations of imagination which provoke thought but to which 
no concept of understanding is adequate.”103  Hence, although aesthetic ideas cannot be 
fully distinguished, they enable us to “express only the implications connected with it 
[the concept] and its affinity with others.”104  Genius, Kant therefore claims, is found in 
the animation of the imagination which serves to find the interconnected relations 
between the concepts of the understanding and thereby find the means by which these 
ideas can be expressed to others.105   
 The second point that Kant makes in the remaining portions of the Dialectic of 
the Beautiful is that although ideas cannot adequately be expressed in intuitions 
schematically, they can be expressed symbolically.  That is, the means by which the 
aesthetic ideas “aesthetically enlarge” various concepts of the understanding is not 
schematic or according to a rule, but rather symbolic or indirect. For example, he points 
out that Jupiter’s eagle is an attribute of the powerful king of heaven, but this is not a 
logical attribute—this is not an attribute that we can connect to Jupiter by means of a 
proof.  Rather, the imagination spreads out over a multitude of representations which 
yield an aesthetic idea by which the mind is animated to make novel connections.106  The 
connection is creative rather than constitutive. 
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 Kant believes that the intuitive representations can be divided into two kinds.  
First, the schematic are those which are presentations of the object of intuition, but not 
designations of the intuitions themselves.  Second, the symbolic representations of 
intuitions, by contrast, unfold by means of analogy.  Like the schematic representations 
they also unfold as “mere expressions for concepts,” but because reflective judgments 
cannot be determined by a concept, symbolic representations contain only indirect 
presentations of the concept, which form according to “the laws of association of the 
imagination” and are thus “expressions for concepts.”107 Kant explains that a “double 
judgment” is made in this indirect presentation (hypotyposis) because the concept is first 
applied to the object of sensible intuition and then the rule of that intuition is applied to 
an “entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol.”108  Thus, ideas, 
namely aesthetic ideas, through reflective judgment are taken up by the symbolic 
presentation and applied first to intuitions and then to other ideas.  More particularly, 
Kant wishes to suggest that the other ideas for which the first are symbols are moral 
ideas.  Thus, ideas of beauty are analogous to ideas of morality.   
 These symbolic representations show that the imagination creatively connects 
concepts for which there is no strict one-to-one correspondence between the concept and 
the aesthetic idea because, as Kant has already argued in the Analytic of the Beautiful, 
the beautiful cannot be the same thing as the good because the beautiful is not 
determined by a concept.  What Kant seems to be suggesting is that, through the 
                                                 




symbolic presentation of concepts, reflective judgments or, as he puts it, “applying the 
mere rule of reflection,” a concept which has been specified may be applied to another 
concept.109  The relationship between this new concept and the old, however, is not 
direct, but rather symbolic. Therefore, as Kant asserted with respect to the aesthetic 
ideas, the means by which the imagination creatively connects various concepts with 
others and enriches our experience of nature is not a direct route, but is rather, to use 
Makkreel’s phrase, an imaginative cross-referencing.110 
 In the third Critique Kant wishes to show that the imagination is free.  It is free to 
create ideas which, although they go unnamed, they nevertheless symbolically apply to 
other ideas which are already understood.  The imagination is not a subordinate faculty 
of the understanding, as it appeared to be in the first Critique, but neither is it completely 
autonomous and independent from the understanding.  Kant consistently maintains that 
the imagination functions in mutual harmony with the laws of the understanding.  The 
free play of the imagination serves as the ground for reflective judgments of taste which 
reveal purposivity without a purpose.  This purposiveness, as noted at the beginning of 
this chapter, can only be revealed subjectively—purposiveness for the faculty of 
judgment.  This purposiveness must also be presupposed, for without it experiences of 
beauty would be impossible.  These experiences are subjective, but, because they depend 
on the harmony of the imagination and the understanding, they are universally 
communicable.  This is revealed through the reflective power of judgment and is 
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 110 See Makkreel, 127. 
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grounded in the free play of the imagination.  Furthermore, the ways in which new ideas, 
and concepts are discovered are through the imagination, which creatively constructs 
new aesthetic ideas which apply symbolically to concepts already understood.  In short, 
the imagination allows us to construct the world by the symbolic broadening of aesthetic 
ideas.   
 The relationship between the creative function of the imagination and Kant’s 
constructivism is not difficult to see.  In Chapter II I suggested, with Tom Rockmore, 
that Kant’s constructivism should be understood as the view that nature depends on our 
knowledge of it and not vice versa.111  In the first Critique, this amounted to Kant’s 
insight that the deduction of the concepts of the understanding provide the conditions 
under which synthetic judgments a priori can be made.  Thus, experience in general can 
be understood with respect to the laws of the understanding.  My suggestion, in Chapter 
II, was that the imagination plays a crucial role in these judgments despite Kant’s 
wariness of making this claim explicitly in the B-deduction.  I suggested that the truly 
radical implications of Kant’s doctrine of the imagination were more fully developed in 
the third Critique.  Indeed, the third Critique, as I have argued, unfurls the imagination 
as a free, creative, and spontaneous faculty which works in mutual harmony with the 
understanding to produce a feeling of pleasure in judgments of taste.  These judgments 
are reflective—not constitutive—because they are not grounded by concepts of the 
understanding, but rather the subjective feeling of pleasure and displeasure.  Through the 
purposivity of aesthetic judgments the imagination is revealed to us as a creative faculty 
                                                 
 111 See Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 9. 
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that constructs the world symbolically rather than schematically.  Thus, the world is 
revealed to us through the free, creative, and symbolic work of the imagination.   
 Kant’s Copernican turn, therefore, becomes even more radical in the third 
Critique because, rather than being a claim about the conditions for experience in 
general (which is already a bold claim), the Copernican turn, when considered through 
the lens of the third Critique, becomes a claim about constructing the world through the 
spontaneous, free, symbolic work of the imagination.  What makes this radical for Kant 
is that world is not only constructed through the determinate concepts of the 
understanding, but also through the creative and symbolic work of the imagination.  
Furthermore, because judgments of beauty are always particular, they are the primary 
means by which we construct the world.  They are both immediate and indirect.  Thus 
the radical nature of the imagination reveals that the world, in all of its particularity is 
constructed aesthetically and symbolically.  It is the imagination that allows us to find 
the connections between various concepts.  It is the imagination that creates for us the 
symbolic representations of language, morality, and even God.112  It is the imagination 
that allows the transformation of our concepts through aesthetic ideas to be 
communicated to others.  It is the imagination, and therefore on this reading the 
Copernican turn, that allows us to indirectly go beyond that which we are given and to 
make nature meaningfully beautiful for us.113 
 
                                                 
 112 See Makkreel, 125. 
 
113 I am indebted to a similar point made by Makkreel, 129.   
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Returning to the Critics 
 My purpose in this thesis has been to show that Kant’s constructivism reveals 
radical possibilities that go beyond those of his successors and critics.  I argued in 
Chapter II that while the imagination plays a crucial role in the synthesis of the faculties 
of the mind, it nevertheless remains eclipsed from our view in the first Critique.  I 
suggested in this chapter that in the third Critique the imagination is unfurled as a faculty 
in free play with the understanding which, through the spontaneous connection of 
aesthetic ideas, constructs the world creatively rather than discursively.  The upshot of 
this chapter is that our experience is grounded in and sustained by the creative, 
spontaneous, symbolic work of the imagination.  Yet, questions still remain.   
 In Chapters I and II I raised several questions regarding Kant’s constructivism 
and its relationship to various post-Kantian thinkers.  I pointed out that many of Kant’s 
successors criticized his philosophy for being too conservative and suggested that their 
views, therefore, either develop or even surpass those of Kant.  It is now time to return to 
this question and raise it again in light of what I have suggested in Chapters II and III.  
The question, therefore, is: Given that Kant’s constructivism reveals the imagination as a 
spontaneously free faculty of the mind, how is it that this suggests radical possibilities 
that go beyond those of his critics?  In the following chapter, therefore, I will make good 
on the promissory note from Chapters I and II by gesturing towards how an answer to 










For a strange thing came to pass, that with this work [the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment], which seems to have grown out of the special demands of his system 
and to be designed only to fill a gap in it, Kant touched the nerve of the entire 
spiritual and intellectual culture of his time more than with any other of his 
works. 
—Ernst Cassirer, Kant’s Life and Thought 
 
   
 Hegel is often taken to be at the same time one of Kant’s fiercest critics as well 
as one of his chief supporters.  He is a supporter because, like many of his 
contemporaries (Fichte and Schelling, for example), he endeavored to develop Kant’s 
key insight which has been articulated in the previous two chapters of this thesis as 
Kant’s Copernican turn.114  Like Fichte and Schelling, Hegel desired to make good on 
the promises of Kant’s critical philosophy while at the same time avoiding the 
difficulties into which he believed it inevitably fell.  Kant, Hegel believed, had made a 
decisive insight in the history of philosophy which, as Robert Pippin points out, Hegel 
self-consciously appreciated as the origin of his (Hegel’s) thought.115  Particularly, Hegel 
agreed with Kant that philosophy should be subject to critique and that philosophy up 
until Kant had been just so much dogmatism.   
                                                 
 114 For a discussion on Hegel’s early life and his relationship to Kant through 
Fichte and Schelling see Frederick Beiser, Hegel, Routledge Philosophers, ed. Brian 
Leiter (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7-17.   
 
 115 Robert B. Pippin, The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath 
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Also like Fichte and Schelling, Hegel believed that Kant’s philosophy was 
fraught with problems.  Indeed, immediately after Kant’s first Critique was published it 
was subject to much criticism and, to Kant’s dismay, misinterpretation.  For example, 
the famous Garve-Feder review of Kant’s first Critique charged Kant with being a 
Berkeleyian, a charge that Kant went to great lengths to reject.116  In his History of 
Modern Philosophy, Shelling articulated one of the deepest concerns that he, along with 
Fichte and Hegel, shared about Kant’s project.  Schelling wrote, “Looked at more 
closely, it is revealed that it is here a question of a knowing of knowing, and that this 
knowing of knowing itself is, in turn, precisely a knowing.  Accordingly it would first 
require an investigation of the possibility of such a knowledge of knowing, and in this 
way one could keep on asking to infinity.”117  Hegel shared this sensibility and, 
therefore, went on to develop his organicism in response to Kant (and in accordance with 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie).118  Hegel thought that Kant’s constructivism was too 
conservative, too wooden, too tethered to the categories.  He believed that both his 
similarities and differences with what I have been calling Kant’s constructivism would 
provide a critical platform from which metaphysics could be developed more 
                                                 
 116 See Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 
1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 89.  For a discussion on 
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dynamically.  Indeed, as Beiser observes, Hegel thought his philosophy was a necessary 
development of Kant’s philosophy.119     
In this chapter, therefore, I will gesture at the claim that Kant’s constructivism, in 
virtue of his view of the imagination, reveals radical possibilities that go beyond those of 
his critics.  I will first focus on Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s philosophy which generally 
takes Kant’s constructivism to be relatively conservative.  I will point out that one 
standard Hegelian criticism of Kant’s philosophy was that Kant’s constructivism is too 
conservative because it relied on a determinative a priori deduction of a fixed set of 
categories.  I will suggest, however, that, given the radicality of Kant’s doctrine of the 
imagination, this counterpoint reveals a failure on Hegel’s part to grasp the creative 
possibilities in Kant’s constructivism.  This articulation of this Hegelian criticism is not 
meant to be controversial, but rather representative of the main interpretations of Hegel’s 
thought.  It will be worthwhile to set it up at some length because, while it is a typical 
and well-known criticism, it nonetheless represents a deep divide in the unfolding of 
philosophical ideas and provides a means by which my suggestions about Kant’s 
constructivism can be shown to go beyond Hegel’s.  Second, I will suggest in more 
detail what the philosophical consequences of Kant’s view of the imagination are as it 
has been discussed in Chapters II and III.  My point will be to elaborate on what it means 
for our knowledge to unfold creatively rather than discursively and to emphasize, in 
contrast to Hegel’s assessment, that Kant’s doctrine of the imagination reveals a 
constructivism that is dynamic and creative.  Finally, my parting gesture will be that 
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insofar as post-Kantian thinkers fail to account for the radical nature of the imagination 
in Kant’s philosophy, they also fail to realize the creative, radical depths of Kant’s 
constructivism. Thus, this chapter should be seen as programmatic rather than definitive.  
I see it as an opening through which further research might begin to emerge with respect 
to Kant’s view of the imagination and the critiques his successors leveled against him. 
 Hegel believes that Kant’s constructivism is too conservative.  One main point of 
departure for Hegel’s critique of Kant’s philosophy is Hegel’s belief that the concepts in 
Kant’s work limit the function of the understanding to a strict mechanical paradigm of 
explanation, to use Beiser’s apt phrasing.120  The concepts for Kant are limited to twelve 
in number and serve as an a priori means by which our experiences can be explained.  
Kant’s epistemology is limited and conservative, therefore, because it sets up an a priori 
standard for the categories of the understanding.  Hegel argues that, on the contrary, the 
concepts should not be limited to any number in particular and that their inner being is to 
be discovered through dialectic.  That is, whereas Kant believes that concepts are 
derived from a priori considerations, Hegel’s insight, in the Introduction to his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, is that “Consciousness provides its own criterion from within 
itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself . . .”121 
Concepts therefore, on Hegel’s view, are taken to unfold in the process of dialectic and 
are thus a posteriori rather than a priori.  He suggests that we do not need to import 
                                                 
 120 See Beiser, Hegel, 165.  See also Tom Rockmore, Kant and Idealism (New 
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criteria external to concepts because “it is precisely when we leave these aside that we 
succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is in and for itself.”122  As Beiser puts 
it, the dialectic “is the inner movement of the subject matter, what evolves from it rather 
than what the philosopher applies to it.”123  Another way to put the objection Hegel has 
in mind here is that knowledge is used as a means rather than an end.  Hegel is 
concerned that Kant’s a priori deduction of the categories uses knowledge as a “tool,” 
but then does not allow for a critical examination of the tool itself.124  By contrast, 
Hegel’s “method” proceeds by experience and does not claim to rise above 
experience.125 
 How does Kant’s view of the imagination reveal possibilities that allow him to 
go beyond those of Hegel?  How does the imagination suggest that Kant’s project really 
lies ahead of Hegel’s?  In the previous chapter, I pointed out that Kant famously makes a 
key distinction in the Introduction to his third Critique between determinative judgments 
and reflective judgments.  Determinative judgments—the kind found in the first 
Critique—begin with general concepts and subsume particulars under them according to 
the schematic work of the imagination.126  Reflective judgments, by contrast, begin with 
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the particular and search for a general concept under which the particular may be 
subsumed.  He writes, “If the universal . . . is given, then the power of judgment, which 
subsumes the particular under it, is determining.  If, however, only the particular is 
given, for which the universal is to be found, then the power of judgment is merely 
reflecting.”127  This distinction leads to one of Kant’s most provocative insights with 
respect to the imagination.   
 Kant suggests that through reflective judgments—particularly judgments of 
beauty—the imagination is revealed as a creative spontaneous faculty of the mind 
through which the world is creatively constructed.  These reflective judgments of beauty 
depend on the free play of the imagination and the understanding and the accord 
produced by this mutual relationship of the two faculties results in pleasure which 
grounds these judgments.128  Something, a work of art, say, is judged to be beautiful 
insofar as the imagination and the understanding produce a feeling of pleasure in the 
subject.  The imagination, Kant goes on to suggest, produces aesthetic ideas whereby 
unnamable connections between concepts are discovered.  The work of the imagination, 
through reflective judgments, is to make novel and creative connections between 
concepts of the understanding always beginning with the particular and moving to the 
more general.     
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 This is a crucial point because Hegel believes that the critique of knowledge 
proceeds dialectically, by which he means according to the logic of the concept itself.  
He writes,  
Consciousness, however, as essence is this whole process itself, of passing out of 
itself as simple category into a singular individual, into the object, nullifying the 
object as distance [from it], appropriating it as its own, and proclaiming itself as 
this certainty of being all reality, of being both itself and its objects.129 
 
The dialectical process, therefore, unfolds according to the category itself.  Of course, it 
proceeds a posteriori, but, Hegel suggests, the way in which knowledge is attained is by 
means of the concept, i.e., the universal.  Thus, knowledge of the world is gained by a 
process of moving from the general to the particular.  Hegel takes this to be a radical 
move beyond Kant’s constructivism, a move which Hegel believed Kant was too 
conservative to make.   
 By contrast, Kant believes that experiences, particularly experiences of beauty, 
unfold according to reflective judgments.  That is, they begin with the particular and, 
through the free play of the imagination and the understanding, look for a universal 
under which that particular can be subsumed.  This, as I noted in Chapter III, shows that 
for Kant experience unfolds as a question rather than a legislation.130  Moreover, the 
imagination reveals the creative, spontaneous way in which the human consciousness 
constructs experience.  Experience is revealed dynamically; it is not dependent upon the 
legislation of the concepts, but rather the free, creative work of the imagination.   
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 Thus, Kant’s doctrine of the imagination suggests that, while the categories are 
necessary for knowledge in general, the free work of the imagination—in all of its 
spontaneity and creativity—is required for the construction of our particular experiences.  
Hegel’s claim, therefore, that Kant’s constructivism is too conservative or, to use 
Beiser’s formulation, too paradigmatically mechanistic, does not account for the radical 
work of the imagination through reflective judgments.  Hegel’s dialectic proceeds on the 
assumption that the deduction of the categories in Kant’s critical philosophy is the 
linchpin for his constructivism.  What my view suggests is that the linchpin is more 
incorporative than Hegel supposed.  Kant’s view of the imagination presents a creative 
means by which the whole of experience unfolds, not according to the fixed nature of the 
categories, but rather according to the radical work of the imagination.   
 It is my claim, therefore, that Kant’s view of the imagination show that Kant’s 
constructivism is more dynamic than Hegel’s.  Through reflective judgments—and 
therefore the imagination—Kant’s view of the mind is free in a way that Hegel’s is not.  
Hegel’s dialectic proceeds by moving from the general to the particular and is indeed 
more dynamic than Kant’s constructivism as conceived in the first Critique.  What I 
wish to claim is that, given the development of the imaginative constructivism in Kant’s 
third Critique, the tables have been turned.  It is now Hegel who is more conservative.  It 
is now Hegel who is limited to starting with the general concept and, from there, 
determining the particular.  Kant, on the other had, begins with the particular and, 
depending on what measure of wit, creativity, or spark of genius one might possess, one 
moves to the more general, connecting concepts by means of aesthetic ideas.   
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Kant’s view of the imagination shows us that much of our experience unfolds 
creatively and artistically rather than discursively and mechanistically.  Through 
aesthetic ideas, the imagination connects and combines concepts in novel and surprising 
ways.  Thus, it is through the imagination that our experience becomes connected to 
novel philosophical ideas.  Accordingly, as noted in chapter III, the imagination unfolds 
symbolically insofar as concepts are taken to represent other concepts with which they 
have no direct connection.  As Makkreel points out this reveals the interpretive nature of 
the imagination.131  This interpretive work unfolds as aesthetic ideas provide us with 
connections in our experience when concepts cannot.  These connections, however, are 
not determinate, but rather creative, reflective, artistic.132  They are not “knowledge” in 
the Kantian sense, but they provide a creatively connected whole of experience which 
would not be possible without the spontaneous work of the imagination.  As Kant puts it 
the mind is animated by the creative work of aesthetic ideas.133 
 In the third Critique Kant indicates that various artistic mediums open up our 
experience in ways that the discursive work of the concepts of the understanding do not.  
Beautiful art is most truly revealed in the art of poetry.134  He writes that poetry 
“expands the mind by setting the imagination free and presenting, within the limits of a 
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given concept and among the unbounded manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, 
the one that connects its presentation with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic 
expression is fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of 
ideas.”135  In other words, poetry reveals novel connections of our experience to us that 
cannot be determined by the understanding.  It is through this artistic medium that we 
find ourselves constructing the world, not according to determinative concepts, but 
rather according the artistic free play of the imagination.  Kant’s view of he imagination 
suggests, therefore, that the world is constructed poetically rather than logically.136 
Hence, the construction of our experience, according to Kant, offers us the 
possibility of a dynamic unfolding of experience.  The imagination, as noted in Chapter 
III, works symbolically to reveal new connections between the concepts of the 
understanding.  Through poetry that which is unnamable according to the categories 
becomes part of our experience.  According to Kant’s view of the imagination, therefore, 
the possibility of a dynamic, artistically constructed world comes into view.  This 
possibility does not arise in Hegel and it is to that extent that Kant’s constructivism can 
be said to lie beyond Hegel’s. 
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, my purpose is to gesture in the 
direction that Kant’s radical view of the imagination might proceed.  I have suggested 
that, with respect to Hegel, one of Kant’s greatest critics, Kant’s constructivism provides 
possibilities that go beyond Hegel’s system.  Indeed, Kant’s constructivism is not 
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mechanistic and conservative, but rather dynamic and creative.  This gesture could 
expand in several directions.  First, Kant’s constructivism, as has been noted by many 
scholars, has left its traces on the philosophy of Romanticism and German Idealism.137  
One way in which research might unfold is by questioning the extent to which Kant’s 
immediate successors appreciate the radical insight Kant’s doctrine provides.  Second, as 
Rockmore has noted, much philosophy in the twentieth century has unfolded “in Kant’s 
wake.”  That is, many philosophers in the twentieth century—Dewey, Quine, Heidegger, 
and others—are to an unappreciated degree dependent upon their various interpretations 
of Kant.138  Insofar as this is the case, my suggestion is that to the degree that these 
philosophers fail to account for Kant’s radical view of the imagination, they still remain 
behind Kant’s project rather than in front of it.  Thus, my claim that the symbolic 
imagination reveals radical possibilities for Kant’s constructivism opens up as an inquiry 
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CONCLUSION: REALIZING THE RADICAL IMAGINATION 
 
The imagination . . . is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another 
nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. 
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment  
  
I began Chapter I by stating that with Kant something new begins in philosophy.  
I also pointed out that many of his successors believed this to be so.  I would like to 
conclude by suggesting that not only does Kant’s view of the imagination show that his 
philosophy reveals possibilities that go beyond those of his critics, but also that, insofar 
as we fail to welcome the creative work of the imagination, Kant still lies ahead of us.  
To this end I will briefly summarize the conclusions of my argument in order to take 
stock of what is at stake for looking beyond this thesis.  Then, I will suggest that the 
research of this thesis gives occasion to examine and reflect upon the responses to and 
appropriations of Kant throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century because it claims 
that not only is Kant’s philosophy pivotal, but also, in some sense, still yet to be 
discovered. 
I argued in Chapter II that although the imagination is crucial to Kant’s 
Copernican turn, it nevertheless remains partially eclipsed from our view.  In the face of 
Heidegger’s criticism that Kant “shrank back” from his radical work in the A-deduction, 
I suggested that, while Kant’s language does seem to belie a certain disparity of thought 
between the two deductions, the imagination is not fully revealed in the first Critique. I 
suggested in Chapter III that, in the third Critique, the imagination is unfurled (through 
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reflective judgments) as a faculty in free play with the understanding which, through the 
spontaneous connection of aesthetic ideas, constructs the world creatively rather than 
discursively.  The conclusion of that chapter was that our experience is grounded in and 
sustained by the creative, spontaneous, symbolic work of the imagination.  In Chapter IV 
I pointed out that one standard Hegelian criticism of Kant’s philosophy was that Kant’s 
constructivism is too conservative because it relied on a determinative a priori deduction 
of a fixed set of categories.  I argued, however, that, given the radicality of Kant’s 
doctrine of the imagination, this criticism reveals a failure on Hegel’s part to grasp the 
creative possibilities in Kant’s constructivism because the imagination in the third 
Critique is the creative, symbolic, and reflective means by which the world is 
discovered.  Furthermore, I suggested that Kant’s constructivism is more free than 
Hegel’s dialectic because the dialectic always begins with the concept and moves to the 
particular, whereas Kant’s notion of reflective judgment opens up the occasion for 
beginning with particulars and moving creatively to more general concepts.  I concluded, 
therefore, that, in this sense, the possibilities of Kant’s constructivism could be said to lie 
beyond those of Hegel’s dialectic. 
As in the previous chapter, my parting gesture will be towards that which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, namely, the many ways in which the radicality of the 
symbolic imagination opens up paths of research into nineteenth and twentieth post-
Kantian philosophy.  First, research might unfold with respect to Kant’s immediate 
predecessors and successors.  That is, by taking Kant’s innovative and provocative 
claims about the imagination as central to his project, it would be interesting to see how 
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this sheds light on the nature of his relationship to Early Modern philosophers such as 
Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume.  For example, as I mentioned in Chapter IV, the Garve-
Feder review criticized Kant by suggesting that his idealism was the same as that of 
Berkeley’s.  Research is needed in this area to inquire into the relationship between 
Kant’s and Berkeley’s view of the imagination as it pertains to their formulations of 
idealism.  The guiding thread would be that the imagination is a crucial aspect of Kant’s 
critical philosophy which allows the world to be constructed creatively.  Insofar as 
Berkeley’s view failed to take this into account, Kant could be seen as holding an 
importantly distinctive form of idealism. 
Second, research might unfold with respect to Kant’s philosophical heirs in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  For example, I argued in Chapter I that Heidegger’s 
criticism of Kant was somewhat misplaced.  My suggestion was that the first Critique 
did not fully reveal the radical notions that Heidegger wished it would.  Another avenue 
of research this thesis opens up is how Kant’s formulation of the imagination in the third 
Critique might correspond to Heidegger’s suggestion that the imagination is the root of 
which the faculties of the mind are the stems.  Again, the point would be to consider the 
radical and creative nature of the symbolic imagination with respect to how Heidegger 
relates the imagination to aesthetic experience.      
 These are only a few examples of the many possibilities Kant’s radical 
imagination brings into view.  It has been suggested that much of philosophy after Kant 
has unfolded “in Kant’s wake” because philosophers have recognized the significance of 
his insights and either critically appropriated them, resolutely rejected them, or 
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wholeheartedly agreed with them.139  Thus, Schelling’s claim with which this thesis 
began seems importantly striking: 
The judgement of history will be that a greater outer and inner battle for the 
highest possessions of the human spirit was never fought; at no time has the 
endeavour of the scientific spirit led to deeper experiences and experiences more 
rich in results than since Kant.140 
 
If this thesis is right, then one might say that the judgment of history will be that, insofar 
as the symbolic imagination is taken to be a crucial means by which the world is 
constructed, Schelling will have been right.  Indeed, insofar as philosophy is taken to be 
a work of the imagination, a free and creative source from the depths of which spring our 
particular experiences of the world, the possibilities of the Kantian imagination will have 
been realized.  That is, the richness of experience awakens by the movement from the 
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